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The George W. Bush administration has successfully reoriented national policy and convinced the
international community of the absolute necessity of denying weapons of mass destruction to
terrorist groups. In addition to utilizing the tools of existing export control regimes, Washington
promulgated the Proliferation Security Initiative and helped push through United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1540 to expand the toolkit available to states to prevent the spread of
dangerous technologies and weapons to terrorist groups. While these efforts are long overdue,
they address only one aspect of the proliferation threat posed by non-state actors. Current efforts
focus on the ‘‘demand’’ side of proliferation from terrorists but inexplicably leave unaddressed the
role that a growing variety of non-state actors may play in shaping the supply side of an
emerging 2016 proliferation market substructure. The proliferation supply network established by
Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan provides a precursor to a dangerous new proliferation environment
dominated by transnational corporations, quasi-governmental entities, and individuals operating
on the fringes of government control in weak or failing states that lack the will and the resources
to implement effective export-control regimes. All states need to develop a more comprehensive
and holistic view of the future role that a burgeoning plethora of non-state actors will play in
nuclear proliferation by 2016.
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The administration of George W. Bush has successfully reoriented national policy and
convinced the international community of the absolute necessity of denying weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) to terrorist groups. In addition to utilizing the tools of existing
export control regimes, Washington promulgated the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
and helped push through United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1540 to
expand the toolkit available to states to prevent the spread of dangerous technologies
and weapons to terrorist groups.
While these efforts are long overdue, they address only one aspect of the
proliferation threat posed by non-state actors. Current efforts focus on the ‘‘demand’’
side of proliferation from terrorists but inexplicably leave unaddressed the role that a
growing variety of non-state actors may play in shaping the supply side of an emerging
2016 proliferation market substructure. The proliferation supply network established by
Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan provides a precursor to a dangerous new proliferation
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environment dominated by transnational corporations, quasi-governmental entities, and
individuals operating on the fringes of government control in weak or failing states that
lack the will and the resources to implement effective export control regimes. All states
need to develop a more comprehensive and holistic view of the future role that a
burgeoning plethora of non-state actors will play in nuclear proliferation by 2016.
Today’s focus on the demand side of nuclear and WMD proliferation from terrorist
adversaries is understandable. The September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks by Al Qaeda and
the subsequent attacks on innocent civilians in such far-flung places as Bali, Istanbul,
Madrid, London, Riyadh, and elsewhere confirmed the worst fears of many strategists who
argued that a new age of unrestricted warfare involving non-state actors had arrived.1 The
Bush administration articulated these fears in its 2002 National Security Strategy,
describing an international environment dotted with adversaries not subject to traditional
notions of deterrence or morality and which may have access to a dangerous array of new
capabilities that could cause death and destruction on a massive scale. Specifically, the
report identified the ‘‘intersection of radicalism and technology’’ as the greatest threat to
the international community, backing up this assertion with statements that non-state
actors, or terrorist groups, were actively seeking weapons capable of inflicting mass
casualties.2 Former U.S. Navy Secretary and prominent 9/11 Commission member John
Lehman put it most concisely in a recent Washington Post editorial: ‘‘The greatest terrorist
threat on the home front is, of course, the use of weapons of mass destruction by
Islamists.’’3
Intelligence assessments back these statements. U.S. Director of National Intelli-
gence John Negroponte told the Senate Armed Services Committee in February 2006 that
Al Qaeda ‘‘remains interested in acquiring chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
materials or weapons to attack the United States, U.S. troops and U.S. interests
worldwide.’’ Negroponte added: ‘‘Indeed, today, we are more likely to see an attack
from terrorists using weapons or agents of mass destruction than states, although
terrorists’ capabilities would be much more limited.’’ According to Negroponte, ‘‘nearly 40
terrorist organizations, insurgencies, or cults have used, possessed, or expressed an
interest in chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear agents or weapons. Many are
capable of conducting simple, small-scale attacks, such as poisonings, or using improvised
chemical devices.’’4 Fears that terrorist organizations are interested in acquiring and using
WMD justify the current emphasis on choking the demand side from this particular family
of non-state actors.
States around the world are now required under international law to mount
intensive counterproliferation efforts aimed at preventing WMD proliferation to terrorist
organizations. UNSC Resolution 1540 directs that all members ‘‘shall refrain from providing
support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess,
transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of
delivery.’’ States are further called upon to ‘‘adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws
which prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport,
transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in
particular for terrorist purposes.’’5 The issue facing the international community as it
contemplates the 2016 proliferation environment is whether focusing states on UNSC
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resolution 1540 and the PSI as a means to deny WMD technology and materials to terrorist
groups addresses the full range of proliferation threats posed by a widening array of non-
state actors.
It is a mistake to assume that terrorist organizations constitute the only or even the
most threatening facet of the impact that non-state actors are likely to play in the 2016
proliferation environment. The nuclear ‘‘Wal-Mart’’ supply network organized by Pakistani
scientist A. Q. Khan, which spanned industrial entities, shipping networks, and states
around the globe, sprung from a sophisticated network of non-state actors, knitted
together by a quasi-state entity operating on the fringes of official government control.6
Trends in the international system suggest that networked structures like that of A. Q.
Khan engaged in nefarious proliferation activities potentially constitute a far more serious
threat to international security than millennial extremist groups dedicated to mass
casualty attacks using unconventional weapons.
Today’s focus on the ‘‘demand side’’ of WMD proliferation stemming from terrorist
groups is arguably misguided and needs to be rethought in order to address more fully
the complexities of the 2016 WMD proliferation threat posed by the entire family of non-
state actors. States and international export-control regimes should be reoriented to
address the role that an increasing number of non-state actors play in both the demand
and supply side of the WMD proliferation environment. The first step is to broaden the
conceptualization of non-state actors, realizing that a growing number of non-state actors
are exerting increasing influence over the international system writ large as part of the
processes of globalization. Only by broadening and deepening our understanding of the
challenges posed by the ‘‘community’’ of non-state actors, can states craft a more effective
approach to export controls and counterproliferation in 2016.
Globalization and Non-State Actors
The burgeoning scholarly literature on globalization notes the virtual explosion in the
numbers and types of non-state actors populating the international system, many of
which are operating on the fringes of state control or under the auspices of states that lack
adequate nationally administered export control regimes.7 Multinational corporations,
nongovernmental and quasi-governmental organizations, and transnational social move-
ments all represent examples of a growing number of organizational structures that
operate across borders on a global scale. International nongovernmental organizations
(defined as operating in more than three countries) engaged in advocacy or direct action
have grown from an estimated 985 in 1956 to more than 21,000 in 2003. According to the
Global Policy Forum, nongovernmental organizations of all types numbered above 37,000
by the year 2000, representing a nearly 20-percent growth over the previous 10 years.8 The
United Nations estimated in 2004 that there were a total of 61,000 transnational
corporations with as many as 900,000 foreign affiliates around the world.9 As indicated
in Table 1, the growth of these non-state groups comes in a global environment
characterized by the dramatic growth in global economic production, worldwide trade,
foreign direct investment inflows and outflows, and the trend toward transnational and
networked industrial conglomerates.
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Within the global environment as described in Table 1, non-state actors play a
critical role in facilitating the accelerating movement of global stocks and flows, acting in
both the supply and demand sides of the growing global economy. Insofar as the nuclear
proliferation environment is concerned, non-state actors today fill the same sorts of
functions, shaping the forces of market supply and demand for the commoditized
materials used in nuclear weapons production. Table 2 describes various kinds of non-
state entities that interact in the supply and demand sides of the WMD proliferation
environment. All of these non-state entities interact in what can be described as a
‘‘substructure’’ of the proliferation environment, which, while currently dominated by
states, may see a dynamic all its own emerge by 2016.
The non-state proliferation market substructure includes at least four characteristics:
(1) legitimate trade in dual-use items that can be used and diverted for nonconventional
and nuclear weapons programs administered by states and non-state actors; (2) front
companies and subsidiaries of quasi-governmental organizations in states such as Iran and
Pakistan that are circumventing export controls on their indigenous nuclear programs, as
well as state-run organizations that are either facilitating the selling, buying, or smuggling
of WMD materials or are engaged in marketing to create demand for their wares; (3) illicit
smuggling networks in radioactive materials administered by states, transnational criminal
organizations, and/or terrorist organizations in cases where proscribed WMD materials are
being transferred; and (4) servicing demand by these illicit networks from violent non-state
actors that seek unconventional and conventional weapons that can be used for tactical,
operational, and strategic effects.
Various aspects of the emerging proliferation market substructure were on display
with the A.Q. Khan network and are ongoing with smuggling networks moving radioactive
materials through Central Asia.10 As the Khan network demonstrated, while it is difficult to
procure turnkey reprocessing facilities from non-state actors, it is now possible to
subcontract production offshore to unsuspecting transnational corporations. The smug-
gling networks in Central Asia show that it is possible to move highly enriched uranium
TABLE 1
Selected Indicators of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and International Production, 1990,
2003, 2004 (billions of dollars)
Item 1990 2003 2004
FDI inflows 208 633 648
FDI outflows 239 617 730
FDI inward stock 1,769 7,987 8,902
Cross-border M&As 151 297 381
Sales of foreign affiliates 5,727 16,963 18,677
Total assets of foreign affiliates 5,937 32,186 36,008
World GDP (current prices) 22,610 36,327 40,671
World exports 4,261 9,216 11,069
Source: Adapted from: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment
Report 2005: Transnational Corporations and the Internationalization of R&D, B/www.unctad.org/
en/docs/wir2005_en.pdf/.
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TABLE 2
Non-State Actors and 2016 WMD Proliferation Supply-Demand
Non-State Typology Supply-Side WMD Demand-Side WMD
Industrial Entities Provide transnationally-based
networks to service demand from
state- and non-state and quasi-sate
groups. In the pre-2000 environment,
the overwhelming demand was for
turnkey operations. The 2016
environment may feature a more
‘‘subcontracted’’ approach to supply
like that in the A. Q. Khan supply and
distribution network.
None, except to satisfy





Pakistan’s Atomic Energy Commission
and Korean Workers Party Bureau 39
in the DPRK, Iran Revolutionary Guard
Corps in Iran, NORINCO in China can
operate outside formal governmental
control. These organizations can use
state-run production companies for
WMD supply purposes.
Can also serve as marketing
agents to actively ‘‘create’’
demand for products or can




Potential unwitting role as masking
agent for quasi-governmental or




Supply-Side WMD Demand-Side WMD
Warlords and Militias Potential role in serving as
subcontractors and transit
facilitators for larger networks.
Seek unconventional
capabilities as part of
competitive process with
rival warlords or states.
Transnational Criminal
Organizations
Service illicit markets in nuclear and
other WMD materials due to








While the Japanese terrorist group
Aum Shinrikyo built an extensive
biological and chemical production
infrastructure, the calculation on the
supply side for terrorist groups
remains: Why build it if you can buy it?
That said, a variety of terrorist attacks
reportedly involving chemical
weapons have been disrupted
in the 20012006 period.
Seek unconventional attack
options as part of
enhancement of group
capabilities either for
negotiating leverage or for
simple desire to inflict mass
casualties. For example,
Al Qaeda is widely reported
to have attempted to
buy nuclear warheads in
Central Asia.
1Role of Korean Workers Party Bureau 39 in regime-sanctioned smuggling activities as noted by
Sheena Chestnut, ‘‘North Korean Smuggling Networks: Illicit Activities and Proliferation,’’
Presentation at the Naval Postgraduate School Conference titled ‘‘Terrorism, Transnational
Networks and WMD Proliferation: Indications and Warning in an Era of Globalization,’’ July
2527, 2006, Monterey, California. Also see Daniel Pinkston, ‘‘Domestic Politics and Stakeholders
in the North Korean Missile Development Program,’’ Nonproliferation Review 10 (Summer 2003),
for a description of the role that the KWP apparatus plays in North Korea’s missile export activities.
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through illicit channels to meet customer demand from around the world. These
phenomena illustrate the many roles played by non-state actors in shaping the emergent
proliferation market substructure.
Industrial Entities
All of the 20th century major state-run proliferation activities that circumvented export
control regimes involved companies from around the world. Proscribed activities in
state-run programs in Israel, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, South Africa, and Pakistan knitted together
transnational procurement networks from both witting and unwitting companies.
Whether it was centrifuges, metal-working lathes, steel fermentation tanks, oscilloscopes,
growth media, chemicals, or any other material used to produce WMD, all these
materials came from industrial suppliers. The Khan network made clever use of offshore
companies, such as Scomi Precision Engineering in Malaysia, to manufacture centrifuges
for the Libyan nuclear program. In fact, most new WMD programs have benefited from
sophisticated uses of witting and unwitting companies as suppliers from around the
world.
Iraq’s biological warfare plant at Al Hakamdiscovered by the UN Special
Commission on Iraq inspectors, in part as a result of the defection of Hussein Kamel in
1995 featured equipment bought from a variety of European suppliers. Iraq’s chemical
weapons development program similarly featured a great deal of equipment bought from
several well-known European companies, such as the German company Karl Kobe, and
chemical precursors from companies in Singapore and Holland. The Iraq Survey Group
discovered a thriving illicit business in proscribed WMD-relevant materials during the
1990s from companies based in as many as 14 countries around the world, including
Ukraine, South Korea, France, Belarus, Romania, Jordan, the People’s Republic of China,
Syria, and the United Arab Emirates.11 To facilitate the acquisition of WMD-related
technology and components, Iraq established a procurement network of more than 200
front companies, some of which were used for only one transaction. Like the Iraq program,
South Africa’s state-run program to develop nuclear weapons featured a sophisticated
network of suppliers drawn from around the world such as Leybold Heraeus, which also
supplied nuclear components for uranium enrichment to Iraq, Pakistan, and Iran before
1990.12 Moreover, some South African companies were involved in the Khan network and
attempted unsuccessfully to manufacture components for Libya’s program.13
The aforementioned examples illustrate the broader challenge to the managers of
export control regimes and other governmental nonproliferation policymakers as they
seek to manage the supply-side proliferation challenge from a variety of non-state actors,
which will continue to grow in number and sophistication through 2016 and beyond. The
supply-side activities of multinational corporations will continue to be a shaping force in
the WMD proliferation market as the global diffusion of technology and information
continues to accelerate through the next decade.
650 JAMES A. RUSSELL
Quasi-Governmental Organizations
A prominent feature of many of the proliferation activities of perennial offender states,
such as China, North Korea, Ukraine, and Iran, is the involvement of organizations that are
obliquely tied to the state itself. The growth in so-called quasi-governmental organizations
around the world has paralleled the growth of the non-state industrial actors described
above. The Congressional Research Service defined quasi-governmental organizations as
‘‘entities that have some legal relation or association, however tenuous, to the federal
government, or to the terrain that putatively exists between the governmental and private
sectors.’’14 The United States, for example, boasts a wide array of quasi-governmental
organizations, including nonprofit organizations such as the U.S. Institute for Peace,
financial entities such as Fannie Mae and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, as
well as federally funded research and development centers such as the RAND Corporation,
to name but a few. These hybrid entities are becoming more prevalent around the world
to help governments provide a widening variety of public- and private-sector services to
citizens and industries alike.15 Not surprisingly, quasi-governmental organizations have
become involved in the security-related functions that previously had been the exclusive
preserve of states.
The involvement of the China North Industries Corporation, or NORINCO, in Iraq’s
illicit WMD-related activities during the 1990s illustrates the problem that can arise when
entities loosely affiliated with the government start acting on their own volition. NORINCO
is not officially part of the Chinese government, though a Chinese government entity is
responsible for its oversight: the Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for
National Defense. According to U.S. arms inspectors in Iraq, NORINCO supplied the Iraqi
armed forces with a wide variety of military and WMD-related equipment, including
gyroscopes intended for Iraq’s missile program, apparently without the knowledge of the
Chinese government. Inspectors found that Iraq had run up a debt of more than $3 billion
to NORINCO, much of which was for materials that had been transferred without the
knowledge of the Chinese government. In the period before the 2003 Gulf War, Iraq was
attempting to structure repayment of its debt to NORINCO through the supply of oil, an
arrangement NORINCO specifically wanted to keep secret from the Chinese government.16
In marketing its wares to Iraq and other customers outside of direct state control,
NORINCO acted like any multinational corporation that seeks to stimulate demand for its
products.
Another example of a quasi-governmental organization in a state known to have
active WMD programs is Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The IRGC conducts many
important security-related functions within the fragmented Iranian bureaucratic system of
governance. The Corps is not formally part of the Iranian military, and it is unclear what
state entities outside the ruling council exercise oversight over IRGC activities. This is
troubling, given the range of programs over which the IRGC is understood to exercise
control. According to Middle East military analyst Anthony Cordesman, ‘‘The IRGC’s
growing involvement in Iran’s military industries, and its lead role in Iran’s efforts to
acquire surface-to-surface missiles and weapons of mass destruction, give it growing
experience with advanced military technology. As a result, the IRGC is believed to be the
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branch of Iran’s forces that plays the largest role in Iran’s military industries.’’17 The Iranian
elected president’s control over the IRGC has always been shaky. During the 1990s, the
United States repeatedly attempted to convince the Iranian government to stop IRGC
support for Iraq’s gas oil-smuggling operations in the Persian Gulf. In that case, as well as
others, the IRGC operated well outside the control of Iran’s parliament and presidency.
The IRGC is also intimately involved in Iran’s support for Hizballah and other terrorist
organizations. To date, the IRGC has shown no inclination to transfer WMD-related
materials to these clients. But a 2016 environment potentially featuring additional
fragmentation in an already decentralized Iranian governing structure could lead to a
repeat of the IRGC’s freelancing activities in the 1990s, when it simply charged Saddam’s
oil smugglers tolls to pass their goods through Iranian territorial waters. The IRGC is an
example of a quasi-governmental organization that at this point mostly interacts on the
demand side of the WMD proliferation market. But as Iran’s WMD programs mature and as
its indigenous production capabilities become larger and more sophisticated, the IRGC
could be positioned also to interact on the supply side as either an arm of the state or as
an independent actor.
The lessons of the Iranian and Iraqi WMD programs point to the significant role
quasi-governmental organizations can play in WMD proliferation activities. As the process
of global state fragmentation continues, and as countries like China and Iran continue the
inexorable process of political evolution, the spaces and opportunities for nefarious
activities by quasi-governmental organizations will only increase. This will create a
fundamentally new supply environment for nuclear proliferation in the coming decades.
Violent Non-State Actors
Governments are most worried about the prospect of WMD use by terrorist groups. But
terrorist organizations are only one type of a broader category of violent non-state actors,
a formidable array of adversaries that have caused many of the humanitarian and political
crises confronting states in the early 21st century. As observed by Troy Thomas, Stephen
Kiser, and William Casebeer in Warlords Rising: Confronting Violent Non-State Actors :
A sample from across today’s geopolitical landscape reveals a Hamas suicide bomber
haunting the streets of Jerusalem, Nepalese Maoists launching another round of
bombings in Kathmandu, and Indonesian terrorist groups and human traffickers
exploiting the horrific aftermath of the December 2004 tsunami. As non-state armed
groups gain greater access to resources and networks through global interconnectivity,
they have also come to dominate the terrain of illegal trade in guns, drugs, and humans.
The broad spectrum of objectives and asymmetric methods of these contemporary
assassins and Barbary pirates fractures our traditional conceptions of war and peace.
Whether concerned about national security or human security, the warlords of the
modern era pose a pressing challenge for which the nation-state is ill equipped.18
The advent of violent non-state actors is tied by many analysts to the ineluctable processes
of globalization and the durable disorder of international politics that has resulted from
what political scientist James Rosenau describes as ‘‘fragmegration,’’ or the simultaneous
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interaction of localizing and globalizing dynamics that are destabilizing states around the
world.19 According to one authoritative source, the Fund for Peace, as many as 60 states
with a combined population of two billion people are in danger of collapse.20 For this
estimate, ‘‘A state is failing when its government is losing physical control of its territory or
lacks a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Other symptoms of state failure include
the erosion of authority to make collective decisions, an inability to provide reasonable
public services, and the loss of the capacity to interact in formal relations with other states
as a full member of the international community.’’21 The trend of failing states*with the
attendant rise in ethnocentric, sectarian, and religious conflict*almost certainly will
continue through 2016 and beyond. Violent non-state actors are flourishing and will
continue to grow in a global environment where states are fragmenting or are proving
unable to fully control the activities of actors within their borders.
Such a global environment would be a big opportunity market for warlords,
criminals, and terrorist organizations. For our purposes, warlords are defined as actors that
exercise de facto social and political control through military means in a distinct
subnational geographic area either in cooperation with, in defiance of, or in lieu of a
functioning state structure. Terrorist organizations are those groups that seek to use the
threat or the application of indiscriminate violence to achieve a political objective.
Transnational criminal organizations operate within the violent non-state actor family, and
here are defined as criminal networks spanning a variety of countries engaged in illegal
activities in contravention of state-administered laws.22
Each of these actors will interact in different ways in the supply-and-demand side of
the 2016 WMD proliferation market. First, violent non-state actors can help service the
demand from states and non-state-based clients that need access to illicit smuggling
networks to hide proscribed activities. There is a natural overlap between terrorist
organizations and criminal networks and activities.23 The tendency of terrorist organiza-
tions to engage in criminal activities as money-making ventures to support other
operations is well documented, particularly their involvement with drug traffickers in
South America. Moreover, Al Qaeda helped finance its operations through a global
business empire of sorts that allegedly involved diamond smuggling in West Africa,
construction projects in Sudan, and sales of honey and perfume on the Arabian Peninsula.
The illicit networks and criminal activities can potentially serve as useful structures for
WMD proliferation activities, particularly related to nuclear and radiological materials. Most
nuclear smuggling incidents involve low-level radioactive materials suited for radiological
devices* just the thing that various terrorist groups have coveted.
Over the past 13 years, the International Atomic Energy Agency has documented 16
incidents of trafficking or other unauthorized uses of highly enriched uranium and
plutonium.24 Only a few of these incidents involved significant quantities of weapons-
grade nuclear material. There are many more cases of illicit trade in low-level nuclear and
radiological materials. During the reporting period of 19932005, states reported 827
incidents of illicit trafficking in low-level nuclear materials, much of which originated in
Russia and the former Soviet republics. It is unclear who the customers are for these
materials, and there are no indications to date in open sources that terrorist groups or
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warlords are taking advantage of illicit nuclear smuggling networks to fabricate their own
weapons.
The relevance of this trade to the 2016 nuclear proliferation market is that illicit
networks could provide a supply-side service in commoditized materials that have
perceived value to selected customers. If some customers are willing to pay for nuclear
materials, transnational criminal organizations will more than likely service the market
using illicit smuggling networks. The demand for these materials can come from a variety
of sources: terrorist groups seeking mass-casualty attack capabilities for bargaining
leverage or for actual use and warlords who might desire WMD to defend their territories
from encroachment by rival warlords or states. The functioning of these illicit smuggling
networks creates the possibility that a variety of non-state actors might simply accumulate
materials to produce nuclear weapons or other WMD because of the perceived value of
the traded items, stockpiling them for their own use or to resell them to other states or
non-state parties.
Recent history suggests that violent non-state actors will operate on both the
demand and supply sides of the WMD proliferation market. While the overwhelming
preference for today’s terrorist groups is to buy existing WMD, there are disturbing trends
that suggest some are also intent on fabricating their own devices. To date, there is only
one example of an international terrorist group that successfully established a WMD
infrastructure to weaponize chemical and biological agents. While the Japanese terrorist
group Aum Shinrikyo spent millions in the 1990s establishing a transnational WMD
production infrastructure, the group proved only partially successful in producing
weaponizable chemical agents. The inherent difficulties in producing chemical, biological,
and especially nuclear weapons suggests that violent non-state actors will play a more
important role on the demand side of the proliferation market substructure. This is true in
today’s environment in which Al Qaeda, for example, is rumored to have repeatedly
attempted the purchase of nuclear warheads in Central Asia.25
Violent non-state actors, however, remain capable of operating on the supply side
and some are still attempting to weaponize their own devices. Law enforcement and
counterterrorist operations have disrupted several suspected plots by Al Qaeda-affiliated
groups to use chemical and biological agents in: (1) Rome, in February 2002, when
authorities disrupted a plot to poison the water supply of the U.S. Embassy in Rome with
cyanide; (2) London, in January 2003, when police raided what was thought to be a cell of
Al Qaeda suspects intent on producing ricin poison; and (3) Amman, in April 2004, when
the Jordanian Intelligence Service seized six trucks wired with explosives and containing
20 tonnes of an unknown chemical reportedly intended to destroy the intelligence
service’s building, the Prime Minister’s office, and the U.S. Embassy.26
The ability of violent non-state actors and/or individuals to construct their own
unconventional weapons cannot be dismissed. A cautionary tale is told from the still
unsolved U.S. anthrax attacks in the fall of 2001 in which a highly trained individual or
group of individuals produced, weaponized, and delivered anthrax. In April 2003 Texas
investigators discovered a homemade sodium-cyanide bomb in the garage of the white
supremacist William Krar, which was capable of killing inhabitants in an enclosed space the
size of a small civic center.27 Krar was discovered only when a package containing fake
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identification cards for the Defense Department and the United Nations was inadvertently
delivered to a New York City address and the recipient mistakenly opened the contents.
While the overwhelming tendency is for violent non-state actors to play on the demand-
side of WMD proliferation in 2016, the continuing efforts of these groups and/or
individuals to supply their own devices cannot be discounted.
Conclusion
Given that a variety of non-state actors will play important roles in the 2016 WMD
proliferation market, the international community must broaden and deepen its under-
standing of these actors if it is to craft effective export control regimes to address the
nuances of this market. The immutable forces of globalization and the continuing diffusion
of technology, facilitated in large part by non-state actors, ensure that there will be ample
opportunity for states and non-state actors to engage in dangerous proliferation activities.
The prospect of continued state fragmentation will open seams and gaps for non-state
actors in the already loosely constructed network of export controls, further complicating
the 2016 proliferation environment.
While the current focus on denying WMD to terrorist organizations is a necessary
and useful start, the international community should undertake a much more compre-
hensive and holistic view of how non-state actors operate in all aspects of WMD
proliferation. Peeking over the cliff’s edge and into the 2016 proliferation abyss leads to
the inescapable conclusion that the problem is much more complicated and much worse
than generally is believed. Structural developments in the international system suggest
that the A.Q. Khan transnational nuclear proliferation network represents a precursor to a
new and very unwelcome world of nuclear proliferation. A world of WMD one-stop
shopping involving quasi-state organizations and transnational corporations that service
states, warlords, and terrorist groups using legitimate dual-use trade in addition to illicit
networks presents a profound and serious threat to international security in 2016 and
beyond.
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